Emerging Maritime Threats and Lessons for the Gulf of Guinea

Recent conflicts around the world highlight how asymmetric drone warfare at sea can let even weak actors threaten key shipping lanes. In late 2023 and early 2024, Yemen’s Iranian-backed Houthi rebels repeatedly attacked vessels in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait using cheap unmanned systems. For example, on 16 December 2023, a U.S. destroyer (USS Carney) shot down 14 Houthi attack drones over the Red Sea, and a British destroyer downed another targeting merchant ships. A Pentagon spokesman noted this volley of attacks “represents a direct threat to international commerce and maritime security”. The Houthis even deployed a suicide boat (“an armed unmanned surface vessel”) that closed to within a few miles of U.S. Navy and commercial vessels before detonating. By early 2025, the militants had “targeted over 100 merchant vessels with missiles and drones”, sinking two ships and killing four sailors. In sum, non-state actors used low-cost cruise missiles, aerial drones and explosive boat drones to harass one of the world’s busiest trade routes.

Houthi Drone Attacks in the Red Sea

• Volume of attacks. Since October 2023, Houthi forces launched “scores of one-way attack drones and missiles at commercial vessels” in the Red Sea. US and UK warships frequently intercepted them – for example, on Dec. 16, 2023 the USS Carney destroyed 14 incoming Houthi drones, and HMS Diamond shot down another.

• High-impact strikes. Even heavily defended ships were struck. In Feb. 2024 the Belize-flagged cargo ship Rubymar was hit by two Houthi anti-ship ballistic missiles in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait; the blasts forced its crew to abandon ship. These missile/drone barrages have targeted vessels with “no clear links” to the Middle East wars, imperilling all merchant traffic.

• Cheap UAS and USVs. The Houthis’ arsenal included inexpensive drone types. They hit ships with ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and small “Shahed” attack drones, and even revived unmanned surface vessels. For instance, on Jan. 4, 2024, a Houthi-controlled explosive boat manoeuvred near U.S. and commercial ships in the Red Sea before detonating. Such unmanned attack boats – often assembled locally with guidance parts from Iran – underscore how low-cost, one-way drones (sea or air) can be deployed en masse against superior forces.

  
  

The net effect was to force shipping to reroute or pause. After a series of Houthi strikes, major companies ordered vessels to avoid the region: French carrier CMA CGM and others “paused their journeys in safe waters”, and Maersk halted transits through Bab el-Mandeb. In short, even though U.S. and allied navies shot down most of these drones, the threat of dozens of fast, cheap drones shifting the balance of power was very real.

Iran’s Strait of Hormuz Drills and Drone Harassment

At the same time, in the Persian Gulf, Iran was showing that it too can use inexpensive methods to challenge a superpower at sea. In late January 2026 Tehran announced it had “temporarily closed parts of the Strait of Hormuz” for live-fire naval drills, a narrow chokepoint through which approximately 20% of global oil passes. Iranian forces launched shore-to-sea missile strikes during these exercises, a rare signal that even global markets could suffer if that route were disrupted. Notably, these drills took place despite the massive U.S. 5th Fleet presence in Bahrain.

Iran also showed it could press drones into service. On Feb. 4, 2026 a U.S. F-35C fighter was forced to shoot down an Iranian Shahed-139 kamikaze drone that had “aggressively approached” the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln some 500 miles from Iran’s coast. Soon after, the destroyer USS McFaul responded when Iranian Revolutionary Guard speedboats, supported by another drone, harassed and tried to board a U.S.-flagged merchant tanker in Hormuz. In other words, even the most advanced air force was tested by Iran’s simple, cheap UAVs and small boats. As one analyst bluntly notes, claims of U.S. “air supremacy” over Iran are “absolutely not true”. Iran’s behaviour demonstrates that relatively low-tech drones and missiles serve as an effective “area denial” strategy: they force even a superpower to divert assets and tread carefully around the strait.

Key Lessons for Atlantic African (Gulf of Guinea) Navies

Atlantic African states – from Senegal to Angola – depend on Gulf of Guinea shipping lanes for oil and trade, much as Asia depends on the Red Sea/Hormuz routes. The recent events teach that even a powerful navy can be challenged by low-cost unmanned threats, so Gulf of Guinea countries must adapt. In particular:

• Expect drone-enabled attacks. UN maritime experts now warn that terrorism using “weaponised drones” is “the top concern” for shipping, even more than classic piracy. Gulf of Guinea navies should treat small UAVs, “suicide” speedboats, and missiles as immediate threats. That means deploying radar and optics tuned for small, fast targets, training crews to identify and intercept drones, and equipping patrol boats with quick-reaction counter-UAS defences (sniper fire, electronic jammers, or shotgun nets). Some coastal militaries in the Gulf of Guinea have begun buying maritime drones and helicopters for patrol; this trend should accelerate.

  
  

• Harden and diversify chokepoint security. Events in Hormuz show the danger if a vital strait is closed. Though Africa’s coasts have no exact analogue to Hormuz, narrow passages (near Lagos or Pointe-Noire) or key oil platforms could be targeted. The Combined Maritime Task Force (CMTF) initiative by Gulf of Guinea navies should be fast-tracked to coordinate continuous surveillance and joint patrols of busy corridors. They might emulate international convoys used in the Red Sea crisis (where US, UK, French and Dutch ships escorted vulnerable vessels). Joint patrols under the Yaoundé Code of Conduct or with friendly navies can multiply presence. Simultaneously, port authorities must have ready plans to reroute or expand safe harbours if a segment of the sea is suddenly rendered dangerous.

  
  

• Invest in countermeasures. African navies are generally smaller than Western fleets, so they must use resources smartly. Northrop Grumman-style airborne early-warning (radar-fitted aircraft), coastal radars, and AIS satellite tracking can provide warning of incoming drones or fast boats. Electronic warfare can also play a role: in one analysis of the Hormuz drills, experts noted the Iranians jammed GPS signals for hours to blind enemy targeting systems. Gulf of Guinea countries should consider similar measures to protect their navigation systems. Conversely, they should field low-cost UAS of their own for coastal patrol and early interdiction – for example, a small drone boat could chase a pirate skiff faster than a manned ship.

  
  

• Cooperate with international maritime security. The Gulf of Guinea already benefits from programmes such as Obangame Express. Those efforts should expand to focus on UAV threats. Private shipping companies and navies should share intelligence on drone-boat sightings, just as they do on pirate activity. Responsible maritime firms now have to determine their own “defensive armaments” to fend off drone attacks. African states can support this by clarifying legal rules of engagement: e.g., when and how a patrol vessel can disable an unknown drone or board a suspicious boat.

  
  

• Plan for low-cost warfare. The core insight from these crises is that cost disparities can shrink. A superpower may deploy an F-35 jet and a destroyer, but an insurgent can buy a $20,000 drone or build a small explosive skiff. Gulf of Guinea navies must do the math: a thousand-dollar quadcopter with a grenade could shut down millions of dollars of trade if unchecked. This means vigilance even when conventional forces are present. As one Middle East analyst put it, it’s no surprise that “total air supremacy has not been achieved” over even a smaller state such as Iran. The same applies at sea: Atlantic African countries cannot take surveillance for granted. Instead, they should train for asymmetric scenarios (drone swarms, suicide launches) that would have been unthinkable just a decade ago.

  
  

In summary, the Red Sea and Persian Gulf events illustrate that small drones and missiles can threaten major shipping lanes even against much stronger opponents. Gulf of Guinea nations should draw the lesson that contesting sea power is no longer only about big ships and aeroplanes. Protecting Atlantic shipping will require investing in unmanned surveillance, flexible defences, regional coordination, and legal frameworks to meet these emerging threats head-on.

Key Takeaways: Gulf of Guinea countries must expect and counter UAV/USV attacks, strengthen chokepoints with both hard (weapons, radars) and soft (diplomatic alertness) measures, employ drones in their own fleets, and work closely with global partners. As one UN expert panel warned, armed drones have now eclipsed piracy as the top maritime security hazard – a reality that West Africa’s seaborne commerce cannot ignore.